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Crisis / Emmen Crisis in Emmen reacts on the financial crisis...

Wed, 22 Jun 2011 21:40:00 +0200

Crisis / Emmen

Crisis in Emmen reacts on the financial crisis and their consequences. A clean and minimal urban plan and architecture gets rid of all the unused program, spaces and materials.

A sustainable strategy influences every scale level in the design. In contradiction with urbanity the park becomes the most urban fragment in the urban structure of Emmen and connects the different neighbourhoods. Eleven small and fragile towers and a 110 m long by 7.5 m in depth mixed-use block are scattered all over the park. Repairing and re-thinking the existing infrastructure created a new hierarchy between slow and fast traffic. Radials for bicycles and pedestrians are on top of a curved meander for local traffic.

A flexible generic structure provides the possibilities for new dwelling concepts. Raw and sustainable materials enforce the sustainable strategy. The architecture changes over time from a raw concrete to a green and healthy facade.

"Another Architecture Office wins De Boog/ Zuidas competitions with Oase, more than an urban camping."

Wed, 22 Jun 2011 20:39:34 +0200

“Another Architecture Office wins De Boog/ Zuidas competitions with Oase, more than an urban camping.”

Photo

Tue, 07 Jun 2011 21:47:00 +0200

NEW TRAINING CENTRE / SLOTERDIJK AMSTERDAM More information will...

Wed, 27 Apr 2011 21:38:45 +0200

NEW TRAINING CENTRE / SLOTERDIJK AMSTERDAM

More information will follow soon.

oASe oASe is a new kind of public building and urban space. A...

Wed, 13 Apr 2011 17:47:00 +0200

oASe

oASe is a new kind of public building and urban space. A green and vertical park includes public functions around an urban camping at six different levels. oASe combines new forms of short-stay camping plots with an urban culture program and congress facilities.

oASe is in contrast with the existing context. The Zuidas in Amsterdam consists mainly out of high-rise offices and dwellings with some commercial spaces on the ground level. Public spaces are rare in this high density environment. Above all oAse is sustainable, temporary and can be re-located at any moment at another empty plot in the city. Finally you can set up your tent just in the middle of the Zuidas and 10 minutes from the old centre of Amsterdam.

Current phase: 2nd round competition De Boog Zuidas Amsterdam. (still ongoing) More information about the progress and development will follow soon.

"Another Architecture Office is invited to present oASe in a second round pitch presentation at..."

Fri, 18 Mar 2011 16:52:00 +0100

““Another Architecture Office is invited to present oASe in a second round pitch presentation at Zuidas Amsterdam””

Leiden Waterfront The Lammermarkt waterfront in Leiden is an...

Tue, 18 Jan 2011 18:33:00 +0100

Leiden Waterfront

The Lammermarkt waterfront in Leiden is an unique opportunity to experiment with a new type of park, an ’urban park’. A park that combines the idyllic green character, with a real urban program. Many of these urban spaces and places are already existing. The main problem is there isn’t a clear structure which links these urban components.

This proposal tries to link and add serveral new public buildings and pavilions. By doing this the whole becomes greater than the sum of its parts.

SCHOOL INTERIOR Another Architecture Office made an interior...

Sat, 04 Dec 2010 13:20:00 +0100

SCHOOL INTERIOR

Another Architecture Office made an interior plan for a new education program for a school in The Hague. This resulted in five blocks containing all the different program elements. Through several layers and different materials of transparency it becomes easy for the teacher to maintain a clear view although serperate spaces are create.

US TERROR TRIBUNE A new approach to architectural design –based...

Thu, 30 Sep 2010 21:04:00 +0200

US TERROR TRIBUNE

A new approach to architectural design –based on an opposition to the dominance of orthogonal and vertical forms– is used for the design of the US Terror Tribunal in New York City. This opposition is based on the outcome of the mappings/ analysis made in an earlier phase and on the argument, developed by Paul Virilio, that there is an explicit relationship between these orthogonal and vertical forms of architecture and the historical as well as structural relations between cities and terror/ war. The presence of fear plays an essential role in the design of the US Terror Tribune by blurring the boundaries/ borders between divine enchantment/ curiosity and divine fear.

The public urban landscape is based on military ideas of optical camouflage this project attempts to create an invisible architecture that uses camouflage patterns to create a disturbance in the visual field of the urban environment. The building structure itself is designed with an inherent tension, both attracting and repulsing its visitors.

"ANOTHER ARCHITECTURE OFFICE LAUNCHES NEW WEBSITE"

Tue, 14 Sep 2010 16:06:00 +0200

“ANOTHER ARCHITECTURE OFFICE LAUNCHES NEW WEBSITE”

- 14.09.2010_Another Architecture Office launches its brand new website. The website will be completed with new projects from 09/10 in the next few weeks.

"NEW INTERIOR DESIGN FOR A SCHOOL IN THE HAGUE"

Sat, 01 May 2010 00:00:00 +0200

“NEW INTERIOR DESIGN FOR A SCHOOL IN THE HAGUE”

- 01.05.2010_Another Architecture Office will make an interior design proposal for the EslooPro school in The Hague which integrates with its new educational program.

VERTICAL CITY / SPONGE BLOCK A folded, slowly inclining street...

Thu, 29 Apr 2010 21:10:00 +0200

VERTICAL CITY / SPONGE BLOCK

A folded, slowly inclining street breaks with the typical verticality of the urban housing block. the street and its squares creates an sequence of different public spaces. slowly, the fast and dense urban environment changes in a typical dutch ‘woonerf’ with a variety of dwelling typologies.

Nominated project / Young Architects Competition BNA 2010

"AAO NOMINATED BY THE BNA JURY"

Wed, 21 Apr 2010 11:54:00 +0200

“AAO NOMINATED BY THE BNA JURY”

- 21.04.2010_Another Architecture Office’s design for the ‘Vertical City’ competition was nominated by the jury. The design named ‘Sponge Block’ was made in co-operation with Architect Niels Limburg. The Jury comments are available at the BNA/ Young Architects website.

"ANOTHER ARCHITECTURE OFFICE ENTERS ‘VERTICAL CITY’ COMPETITION"

Tue, 06 Apr 2010 11:49:00 +0200

“ANOTHER ARCHITECTURE OFFICE ENTERS ‘VERTICAL CITY’ COMPETITION”

- 06.04.2010_Another Architecture Office entered the ‘Vertical City’ Competition in co-operation with architect Niels Limburg. The results will be pronounced on April 21th 2010 at Panama Amsterdam. After the results the project will be published on the website of Another Architecture.

"AAO PUBLISHED IN MARK MAGAZINE"

Wed, 03 Feb 2010 11:45:00 +0100

“AAO PUBLISHED IN MARK MAGAZINE”

- 03.02.2010_The US Terror Tribune design of Another Architecture Office is published in Mark Magazine No. 24 Feb/ March edition in the Notice Board section. Go to Mark Magazine website to order a copy.

"AAO PUBLISHED ON THE WEBSITE OF ABITARE MAGAZINE"

Tue, 19 Jan 2010 00:00:00 +0100

“AAO PUBLISHED ON THE WEBSITE OF ABITARE MAGAZINE”

- 19.01.2010_The spatial research ‘The militarization of New York City’ has been published on the Abitare website at ‘the Reader’ section.

MILITARIZATION OF NYC The spatial analysis/ mapping of the...

Wed, 30 Sep 2009 08:11:00 +0200

MILITARIZATION OF NYC

The spatial analysis/ mapping of the militarization of New York City started with a collection of maps made during the beginning of the graduation project. These maps emphasise the typical spatial characteristics of militarized space and borders at different scale levels and the fact that militarization of space takes places at any given scale level. It’s a stealthy transformation from continuous militarized borders to more fragmented and point-based borders.

Domestic Front

Wed, 02 Jan 2008 00:00:00 +0100

Domestic Front is a theoretical essay written by Bart Nicolaas in late Dec. 2008 during his graduation research project. This essay focuses on the militarization of US cities in the shadow of the urban warfare in cities in the Middle-East. This essay is a theoretical argumentation for the necessity of the spatial research/ mappings in NYC and the architectural design for an US Terror Tribune which followed after this essay was written.

Domestic Front – The militarization of New York City

Introduction

In the shadow of the conflict areas and urban warfare in the Middle East, American cities such as Washington DC and New York City are as well transformed in militarized urban environments. In these cases there is often a stealthy military strategy applied on the urban planning and design at any scale level of New York City and its surrounding environment. In this essay those different military strategies, which are applied on New York City, will be appointed and where it is possible approached from a spatial perspective. All of these military measurements are taken to ‘prevent’ New Yorkers from being attacked by terrorists. In this essay I will try to give an answer on the question of what military strategies are being used to secure and defend the urban environment of New York City and what are the direct an indirect effects and consequences of this militarization on New York City?  Yet, to get answers on the questions of what strategies are being used and what effects and consequences those strategies have on the city itself there should be a clear definition of what militarization of the city means. In this essay the militarization of the city is considered as the way in which a global power –in this case the US government– works to inscribe military strategies, which could be as well defensive as attacking into the planning and design of cities. Thus, militarization of the city does not only include applying military strategies on an urban level, but can as well have its influence on the architecture of the city. Considering this as the definition of militarization of cities, and taking its, in most cases, its stealthy character in account, it becomes obvious that finding these new urban fragments of militarization and mapping these strategies is difficult in a city like New York.

New York City as domestic front

New York City can be seen as one of the domestic fronts in the war on terror. 01 A city defended and secured by Homeland Security, a governmental organization which is there to protect its homeland citizens against threats that are coming form inside the US itself. Every day it needs to value –the terrorists– attack threat at public spaces in cities and its users and translate that threat level in a number of colors. So the US government created a domestic front with far reaching consequences in the city of New York and other American cities. Those cities that are being militarized are often taking an important position on economical or political level and function as arrival port for immigrants and visitors to the US. Cities like New York suffer as well under the ‘war on terror’ and its strategy that “involves deepening state surveillance and violence against those seen to harbor ‘terrorist threats,’ combined with radically increased efforts to ensure the effective filtering power of national and infrastructural borders”.02 New York has always been one of the most important arrival ports and takes now leading positions on both political and economical level, so it is obvious that New York City is influenced by the ‘war on terror’. What happens is that “In both in political debates and policy practice, borders are very much back in style.” 03 New York is the city where this process of creating new and reinforcing the existing borders is clearly visible; slightly helped by its geographical position: a couple of islands and peninsulas which lead to a much more clearer network and numbers of entrances to the city itself. For now this reinforcing of existing borders and creation of new ones has its influence on the quantity and quality of the public space in New York City, where for example the ‘public’ space around the headquarters of the NYPD is completely controlled by checkpoints and heavily armed Police forces and space which used to be considered as public space now acts as neutral zone between the city and the NYPD building. This neutral zone is empty. Cities like New York try to create more and more of these clearly organized urban spaces with closely controlled, visible and invisible surveillance borders.

Clarifying the urban space

From the military perspective clarifying the environment, or in the case of New York City the urban space, is seen as something extremely important to be able to defend and control a city in a efficient way. US Homeland Security is therefore also attempting to redesign the basic everyday systems and urban spaces in New York City. “Even if this is sometimes a stealthy and invisible process. As a result, urban public life is being saturated by ‘intelligent’ surveillance systems, checkpoints, ‘defense’ urban design and planning and intensifying security.” 04 Homeland security has its influence on the physical planning of New York, its management of traffic, its migration and design of public space itself. Most visible are those influences at so-called soft targets 05 in the city of New York. For example, the ‘public’ space in and around Wall Street and the Stock Exchange building is completely barricaded by concrete blocks, steel fences, highly secured checkpoints, surveillance camera’s, a special designed traffic flow plan around the Stock Exchange and for sure, other, more stealthy or invisible measurements to monitor any kind of terrorist (attack) threat. The militarization of New York City on a larger urban scale is even stealthier and harder to map or define. This is because a lot of these measurements are sold to the public under other purposes. For example, the proposal of a charging-zone for cars in Manhattan 06 seems just another proposal to decrease the number of cars, but on the other hand it is an ideal way to control and check every car that goes in and out of Manhattan. In fact, it is again the creation of another border. Besides all the recent taken measurements, we should not forget that fifty years ago in the Cold War period there were military strategies as well that had its influence on designing the city of New York. As first example, the construction of highways in those years was presented to the public as a need for fast transportation of military forces across and between cities and the threat of a nuclear war influenced the designs of urban environments. Secondly, New York and especially Manhattan played an important role in the development of the atomic bomb, or better know as the Manhattan Project. In the NY Times “Dr. Norris writes about the Manhattan Project’s Manhattan locations. He says the borough had at least 10 sites, all but one still standing. They include warehouses that held uranium, laboratories that split the atom, and the project’s first headquarters — a skyscraper hidden in plain sight right across from City Hall.” 07 already at that time something like the cold war had its influence on and in the middle of Manhattan. New and existing buildings and infrastructure were (re)designed and used by the military and took place without anyone knowing. Simply by presenting the public something else than what actually was going on. “The very term ‘Homeland Security’, in fact, serves to rework the imaginative geographies of contemporary US urbanism in important ways. It shifts the emphasis away from complex and mobile diasporic social formations, sustaining large metropolitan areas, towards a much clearer mapping which demarcates clear, essentialized geographies of entitlement and threat. At many scales –from neighborhoods, through cities and nations to the international– this separation works to define those citizens who are deemed threatening as real or potential sources of ‘terrorism’…” 08 In this case New York city isn’t an exception. The goal to clarify New York, a city with more than a hundred different nationalities and cultures, at the level of it’s urban complexity is an important input on the future existence of the city of New York and can be compared with a form of urbicide 09 ; the destroying of multi-ethnical communities. This ‘clarifying’ strategy can eventually lead towards a New York metropolitan area with actual enclaves and their secured borders separating them from each other. This happens already in a more complex way and smaller scale than we have seen before in cities like Berlin before the destroying of the wall or in more resent urban warfare in the former Yugoslavia Republic. Internal city borders will be further reinforced and forming local enclaves scattered across the New York City. No longer it are only continuous lines that separate different ethnical, cultural or social people but by fragmented lines, point-based security checkpoints or systems which filter for example at the entrance of public buildings, malls, offices or transportation infrastructure and separates people.

In a state of fear

Where New York’s public spaces used to transmit the sense of security among strangers 10 , the same spaces are now eroded by new and old threats, such as terrorism and increasing growth of social disorder. At those places, such as the WTC terrain or Wall Street, fear dominates the public space and by contrast, the militarization of its space is presented under the purpose to give people a secured feeling but on the other hand it is feeding the amount of fear. The US government and thus Homeland Security as executant reinforces this fear. “…Homeland Security drive is the production of permanent anxiety around every day urban spaces, systems, and events that were previously banalized, taken for granted or ignored in US urban life […] The ‘Homeland’ is thus cast in terms of a constant ‘state of emergency’.” 11 In the case of New York this means that at many public spaces the militarization tries to be constantly visible to confront citizens with their fear. This is a contradiction; based on the fact the many measurements that are taken to control and defend the urban space should be invisible for any potential terrorists. At last, this fear makes it also possible to take vast military measurements in urban spaces, something, which is the most important aspect from the perspective of the US government.

Defending New York

Besides the strategy to defend and militarize New York by the strategy of Homeland Security there is also the perspective of the army itself and their strategies to defend a city like New York. By taking a closer look at these strategies 12 it is clear that the strategies of Homeland Security are based on these military tactics to defend a city in the best possible way. This military report ‘Field Manual FM 90-10 Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), chapter 03; defense’ starts with “In all cases, the elements of urban sprawl must be analyzed in conjunction with natural terrain in order to determine how to enhance weapons effectiveness to slow, block, canalize and destroy the enemy” 13 in terms of defending New York City it means to use its natural features, the islands and peninsulas to slow, block and canalize the entire population and visitors of its city itself. Entries of subway stations, highway tollbooths and bridges are the main elements that support this strategy. Already at the edges at the city these measurement are being taken. As well the waterways and airspace in and around New York City are under constant surveillance by the US Coast guard and NORAD (North American Air Defense Command). Also from the perspective of infrastructure; planning, designing and maintenance of main roads and railroads are crucial components to rapidly shift and concentrate (army) forces. “The requirement to shift and concentrate major combat forces and supplies rapidly over an extended battle area may demand the retention of the hubs of main road and railroad networks.” 14 which supports the importance of planning and maintaining crucial infrastructure. Next, there is another clear explanation of the extremely high level of control and defense structures around public buildings and its public spaces. “Deny strategic/political objectives. Industrial or economic complexes may be incorporated in the defense for their strategic value, while political/cultural centers may provide psychological/national morale advantages.” 15 In this case, the Statue of Liberty is a good example of a building which is completely barricaded because of those reasons. Just by simply blocking the entrance to this building. All these actions are taken to be in ‘advantage’ of the enemy. By reading this report, things like urban sprawl 16 –mostly seen as something nasty – are considered as an advantage in order to defend the city of New York as well. ‘Urban sprawl adds strength to the active defense by providing covered and concealed positions and restricting the attacker’s mobility and observation.

Islands and neutrality

New York City is built on a number of islands and peninsulas. First of all, under the influence of the militarization of the city there will arise more islands, but in this case artificial ones. As already mentioned before under the influences of military strategies the will arise more and more enclaves scattered around the city which functions as an island. Those new islands are “spaces of strategic implant […] and extraterritorial”. 17 This phenomenon itself comes from the seventeenth century in Europe where the church was the clearest example as a place beyond the reach of the political order and something that is extraterritorial. 18 Nowadays there are many more examples of ‘islands’ and through the militarization of New York the raise of more ‘islands’ are not far away and in some cases already occurring. Secondly, the ‘clarifying’ strategy will eventually lead towards a New York metropolitan area constructed out of internal city borders forming local enclaves scattered across the city of New York looking a bit like camps. These camps are not to be taken as literal as modern examples such as the US Army base on Guatanamo bay, Cuba, where suspected terrorist are in captivity. Under the militarization of New York segregation of people, the control of public space and the huge amount of (in-)visible borders are making urban fragments look more like a camp then they did ever before. Thirdly, there is another interesting and distressing aspect that occurs as well in New York through the militarization of (public) space is the in-between space or better said, the neutral space; a space, which is as well a sort of island in a militarized urban environment. Modern examples of neutral spaces are often in-between spaces on the border between two or more conflict areas, barricaded, only accessible through highly secured and controlled checkpoints. 19 In the future some of New York’s public spaces will as well act as a sort of ‘neutral’ space from this spatial perspective. Already there are thousand of ‘public’ spaces such as NY subway stations where there is a sort of neutral condition after entering the station itself and getting checked, moving through the subway tunnel and leaving the system at another place. But there are also more literal examples where Federal buildings like the City Hall or US Courthouse are being ‘protected’ by construction neutral spaces between the city and the building itself. Under the militarization regime this event will only intensify in the future with as one of the newest examples the Offices of Emergency Management (OEM) in New York City, which is built in a small park in Brooklyn near the Williamsburg Bridge. Here the park itself functions as the neutral space. The park space around this building in not accessible for people and is highly controlled en secured. In other designs this neutral space is intergraded in the building itself. In the recent built WTC tower 7 by SOM and the new Freedom Tower by D. Childs and D. Libeskind the building itself contains a neutral space. At least the first 40 meters of both towers are filled with technical installations and are entirely made of concrete with a neutral space/ void between the concrete and the façade. This facade is as well designed to resist any terrorist bomb attack. There is no longer an overlap between a –possible terrorist target– building and the city. Neutral spaces and its consequence of separated or fragmented spaces are more or less described by L. de Cauter in his book ‘The Capsular Civilization’ 20 where such spaces are seen as capsules. These spaces can be seen as controlled public spaces but as well as spaces inside buildings where inside those capsules the owner (the state or private companies) is seen as responsible for our security. You will see the capsular spaces already scattered all over New York City in or around almost any public building or space. The use of the space is determent by its owner and controlled by surveillance technology and ‘no acceptable’ behavior will lead to exclusion of such a capsular space. In this search for maximum security we hand in our freedom.

From continuous lines to fragmentation and points

In the same country and at the same time as where hundreds of kilometers of fences are being planned trying to construct a complete militarized border between the US and Mexico there is also a change in understanding the border only as a continuous line. At the lower scale level of the urban environment and in the city like New York, not continuous lines but fragmented and more point-based borders are securing and controlling the city. All those fragmented line-borders and points together a scattered all around the city and only intensive more and more by the political influence of military allied agencies such as the US Homeland Security or even private (armed) forces. As already mentioned before, these spaces can be considered as capsules. Those point-base borders and fragmented line-borders are strongly related to the different layers of networks in New York City. Therefore there is a strong relation between those –infrastructural– networks and military strategies in this period where New York seems to have and dangerous and mostly invisible enemy who is capable to attack the city at its most important and vulnerable places at any time. These new borders are feeding the creation of new islands within the city itself.

Conclusion

Thus, it is be clear that Homeland Security and its military strategies have their influence into the planning and design of New York. By creating and maintaining fear under its citizens makes it possible to apply a ‘clarifying’ strategy on the city’s future planning and design. At many public spaces the militarization tries to be constantly visible to confront citizens with their fear where in other cases the militarization is much more stealthier applies on the urban environment. In a spatial way the creation of neutral zones around possible terrorist targets influences many public spaces in a negative way. There is the loss of the amount of public space and a qualitatively poorer space left over. With the shrinking freedom of movement, behavior and a de-connection between buildings and the public space itself the public space is threatened by military strategies and its consequences. In most cases those military strategies have a stealthier character and therefore they are harder to define and map. At last there is a new understanding of borders in New York City. Not continuous lines but fragmented and more point-based borders are now securing and controlling the city. All those fragmented line-borders and points together a scattered all around the city and only intensive more and more by the political influence of military allied agencies such as the US Homeland Security. The consequence of these fragmented spaces are more or less described by L. de Cauter in his book ‘The Capsular Civilization’ 20 where such spaces are seen as capsules; highly secured spaces controlled by surveillance technology and borders. For the consequences in the near future I can only speculate about different scenarios that will take place, but eventually terrorist targets will be secured and defended in the most efficient way possible with the result that public space and urban complexity will lose in quality and quantity. All those scenarios contain a way to secure and defend a building, space or even network. Hardening the target, decentralize or relocated, diffusion and camouflage are all possible scenarios in the case of militarization of New York City. However, these scenarios cannot provide complete security. Terrorists will always look for the weakest point in the defense of a specific target or in society itself and to be clear, there is always a weak point; from corruption to a small gap in a fence. New York’s architecture and urbanism is going into the direction of maximum-security and militarized spaces with the smallest chance of any gap or failure with the consequences the urban complexity and ‘public’ space in New York City is under pressure.

Notes

01 Graham, Stephen, Constructing ‘Homeland’ and ‘Target’-Cities in the ‘War on Terror’ published in Public Culture no.15, New York, Duke university press, 2005, p. 65-89.
02 Graham, Stephen, Constructing ‘Homeland’ and ‘Target’-Cities in the ‘War on Terror’ published in Public Culture no.15, New York, Duke university press, 2005, p. 65-89. 
03 Andreas, Peter and Biersteker, Thomas, The rebordering of North America, New York, Routledge, 2003.
04 Johnson, James, Immigration reform, homeland defense and metropolitan economies in the post 9-11 environment. Published in Urban Geography no. 23, 2002, p. 201-212 and Williams, Robert, Terrorism, anti-terrorism and the normative boundaries of the US polity: The partiality of politics after 11 September 2001, Space and Polity no.7, 2003, p.273-292. Quote itself is coming from Graham, Stephen, Constructing ‘Homeland’ and ‘Target’-Cities in the ‘War on Terror’ published in Public Culture no.15, New York, Duke university press, 2005, p. 65-89. 
05 Soft-targets are considered as vulnerable targets for any terrorist attack and are not designed in any way to give any protection for its users and/ or environment. Those soft-targets are mostly important infrastructure, public buildings or public spaces. 
06 From the NYC Plan website . 
07 Broad, J. William, Why they called it the Manhattan project, NY Times, 30 October 2007, science section 08 Graham, Stephen, Constructing ‘Homeland’ and ‘Target’-Cities in the ‘War on Terror’ published in Public Culture no.15, New York, Duke university press, 2005, p. 65-89. 
09 Shaw, Martin, New wars of he city; Relationships of ‘urbicide’ and ‘genocide’, In S. Graham (ed.), Cities, War and Terrorism: Towards and Urban Geopolitics, Oxford, Blackwell, 2004. 
10 Body-Gendrot, Sophie, Feeling save in the crowd. The case of New York, reflection paper at the Urban Age New York conference 2005, introduction. 
11 Luke, Tim, Everyday techniques as extraordinary threats: Urban technostructures and nonplaces in terrorist actions. In S. Graham (ed.), Cities, War and Terrorism: Towards and Urban Geopolitics, Oxford, Blackwell, 2004 12 Field Manual FM 90-10 Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), chapter 03; defense by the Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) FM 90-10  Headquarters  Department of Army,  Washington, DC, 15 August 1979 (last review April 2001), published on the internet http://www.cartome.org/fm90-10.htm#chapter3 and/ or http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/90-10/toc.htm 
13 See footnote 12. 
14 See footnote 12. 
15 See footnote 12. 
16 ‘Sprawl is the nasty term that has become even nastier in recent years…’ Soja, Edward,W, Sprawl is no longer what it used to be, published in Posturban, Exfragmentations, Sub and Disconstructions: Rotterdam, 010 publishers, 2002, p. 76. 
17 Geisler, Ines, Weizman, Eyal, islands, Published in Archis no. 6, Amsterdam, 2003. 
18 See footnote 17. 
19 Palmesino, John, Neutrality, Published on the website/ blog of Eyal Weizman; Roudtable Blog, 2003
20 Cauter de, Lieven, The Capsular Civilization; The City in the Age of Fear , Reflect #3, Rotterdam, NAI publishers, 2005
21 See footnote 20.